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ABSTRACT Contemporary critical theorising on US Empire tends to diverge in
two ways. First, more traditional approaches tend to foreground the national
basis of the USA’s imperial project and the subsequent ongoing inter-imperial
rivalry inherent between rival capitalist states and regions. A second ‘global-
capitalist’ approach rejects the notion of US Empire and instead posits the
transcendence of a nationally based imperialism in favour of an increasingly
transnationally orientated state and global ruling class. I argue that both
accounts fail in their singularity to capture the nature and role of the US state
within a global political economy. Instead, I argue that the US state has long
been both subject to and demonstrative of a dual national and transnational
structural logic that seeks to enhance US national interests while reproducing a
world order favourable for global capital as a whole. Crucially, the end of the
Cold War and the terrorist attacks on 9/11 have exacerbated the tensions
between these dual logics; these will potentially affect both the hegemony of
American Empire and the future of international relations in profound ways.
After 9/11 it has become common to analyse the USA as an empire and US
interests in the third world as essentially (neo)-imperialist. This ‘new imperial’
discourse is typically periodised in relation to either the post-9/11 era or the
end of the Cold War. This article starts by outlining these new discourses and
then critiquing them by arguing that the US state has long been imperial. I
ground the contemporary trends in US foreign policy within the historical
development of global capitalism. While historical materialism has long
theorised on the relationship between capitalism and imperialism, Lenin’s
notion of inter-imperial rivalry between leading capitalist states is not
sufficiently attentive to the transnationalisation of capitalism and the
relatively benign and positive-sum nature of US Empire in relation to other
core capitalist powers. Conversely, ‘global-capitalist’ theorists who posit the
transcendence of the nation state and American Empire through the
transnationalisation of capital and class fail to fully capture the continuity
of a logic of ‘national interest’ inherent within US Empire. After outlining
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these competing theories of contemporary US Empire the article historicises
the role of the US state within a global political economy and argues for a
dual ‘national’ and ‘transnational’ logic inherent within contemporary US
Empire that seeks to enhance US interests in the world and maintain a world
order conducive to the generic reproduction of global capitalism. Crucially,
the end of the Cold War and 9/11 have exacerbated the tensions between
these dual logics, which will in turn radically affect the American Empire’s
relations with other leading capitalist powers and its future role in world
order.
The new imperial discourses
One of the pre-eminent historians of American Empire, William Appleman
Williams, famously stated that one of the central ‘themes of American
historiography is that there is no American Empire’.1 With the events of 9/11,
however, the analysis of America as a global empire has moved from the
margins of International Relations (IR) scholarship and gained increasing
usage among hitherto mainstream analysts of US foreign policy and world
order.2 This trend has undoubtedly been spurred on by the USA’s
increasingly unilateral policy orientation, which has sought overtly to bypass
global institutions of multilateral governance, combined with its new doctrine
of pre-emptive war against a number of third world states that comprise a so-
called ‘axis of evil’ as part of a global ‘war on terror’.3 As Michael Cox
pointedly argues, after 9/11 a number of analysts are now arguing that ‘we
should start calling things by their right name, drop the pretence that
America is not an Empire, and accept that if the world was going to be a
stable place, the US had to act in much the same imperial fashion as the
British and Romans had done several centuries before’.4 Cox’s point
underscores the importance of 9/11 to the emergence of this supposedly
new imperialism. Thomas Friedman, for example, compares the events of 9/
11 with the Second World War and the end of the Cold War in terms of its
significance for international order and US foreign policy. He uses the events
of 9/11 to call for a more imperial US policy in relation to the so-called third
world ‘failed states’:
World War I gave birth to the League of Nations and an attempt to re-create a
balance of power in Europe, which proved unstable. World War II gave birth to
the United Nations, NATO, the IMF and the bipolar US – Soviet power
structure, which proved to be quite stable until the end of the Cold War. Now,
Sept 11 has set off World War III, and it, too, is defining a new international
order.
Friedman continues that, like the earlier cold war era, the new post-11
September era ‘is also bipolar, but instead of being divided between East and
West it is divided between the World of Order and the World of Disorder’
with the mission of the world of order led by the overwhelming power of the
USA to ‘stabilize and lift up the World of Disorder’.5 Within the new US
imperial discourse there are various sub-discourses which are animated
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around the essentially benign nature of contemporary US Empire. Michael
Ignatieff argues that:
America’s Empire is not like empires of times past, built on colonies, conquest
and the white man’s burden. . .The 21st century imperium is a new invention in
the annals of political science, an Empire lite, a global hegemony whose grace
notes are free markets, human rights and democracy, enforced by the most
awesome military power the world has ever known.6
Moreover, the USA is invariably portrayed as a reluctant empire that has
almost accidentally inherited the capacity for global power projection thanks
to the preponderance of power left over from the superpower confrontation.
America’s Empire was thus not desired nor sought, but was established
almost by default with the extension and consolidation of empire in the post-
11 September era allegedly driven by defensive considerations to bring order
to the zone of war within the Third World. Condoleezza Rice, President
Bush’s National Security Adviser, boldly declared that ‘the collapse of the
Soviet Union and 9/11’ signified a major shift in ‘international politics’ with
the post-11 September era providing the USA with the opportunity to
‘expand the number of democratic states’ in the Third World.7 Robert
Kaplan explained that there is ‘a positive side to Empire. . .It’s in some ways
the most benign form of order’, as a globally hegemonic USA provides the
best hope there is for peace and stability.8
Sebastian Mallaby echoed Kaplan’s themes and argued that, in the post-11
September era, ‘anti-imperialist restraint’ on the part of the USA, which has
allegedly characterised its foreign policy since ‘World War II’, is increasingly
becoming ‘harder to sustain’. He continues that to protect itself against
‘terrorists, drug smugglers and other international criminals’ that find refuge
in ‘failed states’, the USA must now acknowledge its ‘reluctantly’ imperial
role in world order, and self-consciously adopt a ‘logic of neo-imperialism’
when dealing with Third World failed states.9
Some analysts have even suggested that the lack of US Empire was the
reason for the 11 September attacks. The Wall Street Journal’s features
editor, Max Boot, argued that ‘the Sept 11 attack was a result of insufficient
American involvement and ambition; the solution is to be more expansive in
our goals and more assertive in their implementation. . .US imperialism—a
liberal and humanitarian imperialism, to be sure, but imperialism all the
same—appears to have paid off in the Balkans’. He continued that the
solution for ‘troubled lands’ in the developing world is a ‘sort of enlightened
foreign administration once provided by self-confident Englishmen in
jodhpurs and pith helmets’.10 According to Stratfor, one of the USA’s
leading corporate intelligence firms, ‘Sept 11 created an unintended
momentum in US foreign policy that has led directly to empire-
building. . .The United States. . .is an imperial power, not in the simplistic
Leninist sense of seeking markets, but in the classical sense of being unable to
secure its safety without controlling others.’11 The US state is thus seen as an
imperial state overseeing a global empire which brings benefits to both other
Western states and also the inhabitants of war-torn states and regions via the
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US Empire’s core mission of forcible humanitarian interventions, democracy
promotion, and the elimination of global terrorism.
These themes have been echoed by US planners themselves. The pre- 9/11
draft 1992 Defense Planning Guidance (DFG) paper drawn up by then Under
Secretary for Policy Paul Wolfowitz and US Secretary of Defense Richard
Cheney was sent to military leaders and Defense Department heads to
provide them with a geopolitical framework for interpreting the US role in
the post-cold war era. The DFG argued that the USA’s ‘first objective is to
prevent the re-emergence of a new rival’ in the post-cold war era. In so doing
the USA should ‘endeavour to prevent any hostile power from dominating a
region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to
generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the
territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia’.12 Under the office
of the current US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, private studies of
past great empires have been conducted so as to ascertain ‘how they
maintained their dominance’ and what the USA could learn from the
‘successes and failures of ancient powers’.13 Richard Haass, the director of
policy planning at the US Department of State, and the USA’s lead co-
ordinator for post-Taliban Afghanistan, openly called for the re-conceptua-
lisation of the USA as an imperial power within world order: ‘building and
maintaining such an order would require sustained effort by the world’s most
powerful actor, the United States. For it to be successful would in turn
require that Americans re-conceive their role from one of a traditional
nation-state to an imperial power.’14 Perhaps the clearest indication of this
new imperial discourse, however, was the Bush administration’s 2002
National Security Strategy, which echoed the earlier 1992 DFG paper. In it
the Bush administration committed itself to building up its military forces to
deter any potential rival for world supremacy: ‘Our forces will be strong
enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build up in
the hopes of surpassing, or equalling, the power of the United States’.15
However, US Empire has not been without it critics. Among the most
perceptive, Ikenberry fears that the USA’s new ‘imperial grand strategy’,
which seeks to utilise its current preponderance of global power into a ‘world
order in which it runs the show’ could ultimately lead to other states seeking
to ‘work around, contain and retaliate against US power’. Moreover, this
‘grand strategic vision’ could potentially leave the world ‘more dangerous
and divided—and the United States less secure’.16 In sum, a new imperial
discourse has developed when analysing the US state and its role within
world order, with the USA increasingly seen as a relatively benign empire as a
result of the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks on 9/11.
Periodising American Empire
These arguments, however, have a number of problems. Inherent within this
new imperial discourse is the periodisation of US Empire to the post-cold war
or post-9/11 era, or to the election of the Bush administration and the
ideological orientation of its key neo-conservative members.17 Yet this
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assertion is operationalised by an inherently orthodox historiographical
reading of US foreign policy during the cold war period that overestimates
the geopolitical centrality of anti-communism as the primary motivation for
US cold war grand strategy. Importantly this orthodox historical narrative
erases entirely the long-term commitment of the US state to the policing and
reproduction of world capitalism, in which it enjoys a predominant position.
As Andrew Bacevich argues, a reading of ‘US grand strategy from the late
1940s through the 1980s as ‘‘containment’’—with no purpose apart from
resisting the spread of Soviet power—is not wrong, but is incomplete’. He
continues that the USA has long sought to ‘open up the world politically,
culturally, and, above all, economically’ and, as such, the USA has long been
an empire.18
The US role as the lead state within world capitalism became increasingly
apparent with the bankrupting of Great Britain, the custodian of global
capitalism before the end of World War II. US pre-eminence was
underwritten by its unrivalled military, political and economic power. At
the end of World War II, for example, the USA had almost half of the
world’s manufacturing capacity, the majority of its food supply and nearly all
its capital reserves.19 The centrality of the USA in underwriting a capitalist
world order was recognised early on by US planners. In 1942 US Secretary of
State Cordell Hull argued that leadership ‘towards a new system of
international relations in trade and other economic affairs will devolve
largely on the United States because of our great economic strength’. He
went on to assert that the USA ‘should assume this leadership and the
responsibility that goes with it, primarily for the reasons of pure national self-
interest’.20 In this new role, the postwar US national interest was articulated
around a dual vision; the maintenance and defence of an economically open
international system conducive to capital penetration and circulation coupled
with a concomitant global geo-strategy of containing social forces considered
inimical to capitalism, including but extending far beyond alleged Soviet-
aligned communists.21 National Security Council Document sixty eight (NSC
68) was one of the central documents outlining the USA’s policy of
containment. Within it was a very clear statement of intent on the part of the
USA. NSC 68 argued that the USA’s ‘overall policy at the present time’ is
‘designed to foster a world environment in which the American system can
survive and flourish’. NSC 68 went on to assert that even ‘if there were no
Soviet Union we would face the great problem of the free society. . .of
reconciling order, security. . .with the requirement of freedom’.22
This reconciliation of order, security and freedom and the role that the US
state would play in underwriting world order was encapsulated by the ‘Grand
Area’ strategy which served as a blueprint for US policy in constructing the
postwar international system. The Grand Area strategy was developed by the
influential Council on Foreign Relations and senior US policy makers,23 and
emerged from an analysis of what caused World War II. It was attributed to
the disintegration of the inter-war international order and the emergence of
rival spheres of influence and protectionist blocs among capitalist powers.
The Grand Area strategy sought to eliminate the potential for inter-imperial
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rivalry between the leading core states and called for the opening up of
hitherto closed territories for investors and traders and the incorporation of
rival capitalist nations under US economic, political and military hege-
mony.24 Moreover, it required the break-up of the old European empires and
included not only what had been formerly under British imperial control, but
also the Western Hemisphere, the Far East and the Middle East.25
This postwar strategy was designed to ‘solve the internal problems of
Western industrial capitalism’ argues John Ikenberry, and to ensure the long-
term ‘economic and military viability’ of the USA by securing ‘markets and
supplies of raw materials in Asia and Europe’.26 George Kennan, one of the
central architects of US postwar policy cynically captured the role of the US
state in a top secret planning document in 1948. Kennan argued that the US
has
about 50% of the world’s wealth, but only 6.3% of its population. . .In this
situation, we cannot fail to be the object of envy and resentment. Our real task
in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships that will permit us to
maintain this position of disparity.27
In devising ‘a pattern of relationships’ US planners constructed a liberal
international economic order integrated with (and largely beneficial to) other
leading capitalist powers under the tutelage of the US state, or what Geir
Lundestad has termed ‘Empire by invitation’ in relation to the major
European capitalist powers.28 The massive levels of postwar US foreign
direct investment into Japan and Europe further integrated the leading
powers into a common ‘informal American Empire’,29 and it was in this way
that the US state was internationalised in its global relations and subsequent
obligations. Henry Kissinger captured this new reality in the early 1970s
when he argued that the ‘United States [had] global interests and
responsibilities’ while ‘our European allies’ merely ‘have regional interests’.30
Importantly, US hegemony relied upon consent as well as force, and its forms
of highly successful capital accumulation based on Fordist industrialisation
and Taylorist modes of workplace control provided attractive models for
other capitalist states keen to recover from the devastation of the war.31 The
emulation of these modes of ‘Americanism’ coupled with US domination of
the Bretton Woods institutions and its security alliances such as NATO and
the Japan –US security pact further entrenched US Empire and pulled
hitherto rival states within its relatively benign imperium.32
If the ‘soft power’33 and forms of multilateral co-ordination of US Empire
were felt most keenly among the Japanese and European states, in the Third
World it was another story entirely. Given the ferment developed as a result
of rapid decolonisation and massive class disparities, coupled with the often
narrow social base of a number of third world states, American Empire
frequently fell back on tried and trusted modes of coercive statecraft more
reminiscent of conventional notions of imperial rule. However, unlike earlier
empires that sought to ‘physicalise’ their rule through territorial acquisition
and control, the US state principally sought to act through pre-existing state
structures and local ruling classes. Indigenous pro-US elites both ensured
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internal ‘stability’ through the containment of potential inimical social forces
and were externally responsive to the wider requirements of the US imperial
state and the capitalist global political economy.34 Third world militaries,
trained and funded by the USA, became central conduits through which US
power extended to underwrite and police the burgeoning US Empire in the
Third World. These forces provided a bulwark against varying forms of
internal reformism, with a wide range of oppositional social forces refracted
through the lens of cold war anti-communism.
In Latin America alone one of the USA’s counter-insurgency training
academies, the School of the Americas (SOA) had trained over 40 000 Latin
American military personnel by the end of the Cold War.35 Kennan
explained that, in dealing with dissent during the Cold War, the final answer
‘may be an unpleasant one’ but the USA ‘should not hesitate before police
repression by the local government ’. Kennan considered this repression not
only to be strategically necessary but also to be ethically correct, as ‘the
Communists are essentially traitors’. He continued that it ‘is better to have a
strong regime in power than a liberal government if it is indulgent and
relaxed and penetrated by Communists’.36 The human cost of this support
was enormous, with all but 200 000 of the 20 million people who died in wars
between 1945 and 1990 dying in the Third World.37
Throughout the Cold War US coercive statecraft encompassed a number
of modalities ranging from overt support for allied states’ counter-insurgency
campaigns to ‘containment and rollback’ of inimical social forces, to covert
support for coups to unseat insufficiently pro-US governments that
threatened to pursue non-capitalist forms of development and thus provide
an example to other third world states.38 For example, in one of the earliest
postwar US coups justified under the rubric of US anti-communist
containment, Charles R Burrows of the US State Department’s Bureau of
Inter-American Affairs declared that the democratically elected government
of Guatemalan nationalist leader Jacob Arbenz ‘has become an increasing
threat to the stability of Honduras and El Salvador. Its agrarian reform is a
powerful propaganda weapon; its broad social program of aiding the
workers and peasants in a victorious struggle against the upper classes and
large foreign enterprises has a strong appeal to the populations of Central
American neighbours where similar conditions prevail.’39
Similar examples of imperial logic ran throughout US-backed campaigns
to maintain pro-US regimes in the face of either democratic or revolutionary
forms of popular resistance to authoritarian rule. Soviet expansionism (real,
imagined, or used as a pretext for intervention) was merely one of a number
of threats to the generic interests of capitalism within the Third World and,
given the increasingly global nature of US commitments, the US Empire
itself. The primary threats were indigenous nationalisms that looked likely to
terminate the incorporation of markets on terms favourable to Western
capital or to present potentially alternative models of non-capitalist
development.40
In essence then, analysts who posit the supposed new US Empire that has
emerged from the post-cold war or 9/11 era adopt an implicit assumption of
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discontinuity in relation to US objectives when in fact there are major
continuities between US cold war and post-cold war policy objectives (and
between different administrations).41 In short, the USA has long been an
empire, both informally, through its commitment to maintaining global free
trade within a world system of ostensibly sovereign states in which it enjoys
market preponderance, and in the more formal aspects of empire, including
ongoing military interventions and covert statecraft to unseat governments
considered to be potentially inimical to imperial interests.42 Michael Cox
captures this well when he observes:
many of the broader objectives sought by the United States since 1989 actually
bear a strong resemblance to those it pursued before the end of the Cold War
and the fall of the USSR. . .the underlying aim of the US, to create an
environment in which democratic capitalism can flourish in a world in which
the US stills remains the dominant actor, has not significantly altered.43
The occlusion and presentist bias inherent within the new US imperial
discourse is possibly a result of the fact that IR as a discipline has long
avoided the interrelated concepts of imperialism and capitalism, and the
explanatory power they afford when analysing international politics and the
role of leading capitalist states within an asymmetric global political
economy.44 As Fred Halliday has argued, while ‘IR has recognised the
importance of structures of power and inequality’ it has treated these
structures as ‘self-standing entities, separate from, or at best contingently
related to, the world market and the global organisation of production’. He
continues that the twin analytical concepts of imperialism and its relationship
to capitalist globalisation are ‘two absent terms’ in the IR canon and affirms
the usefulness of historical materialist theorisations on imperialism and their
relevance for IR.45 Interestingly, one could add that imperialism as a world
analytic had also dropped off the historical materialist radar until very
recently. This was possibly because Lenin’s zero-sum theory of inter-
imperialist rivalry and the likelihood of war between core capitalist powers
(which has long enjoyed the running in historical materialist debates on
imperialism) is increasingly redundant in the face of the pacific reality of US
Empire. Given the largely positive-sum political and economic structures
established between leading capitalist states under the aegis of American
empire, combined with the massive levels of foreign direct investment
between America, Europe and Japan, Lenin’s theories of inter-state war
between competing capitalist powers serves as an increasingly ineffective
road-map in charting the nature of international politics and contemporary
forms of capitalist globalisation.
In this paper so far I have sketched and defended an alternative
periodisation of ‘US Empire’ and have attempted to locate contemporary
US foreign policy trends within the longer-term role that the US state has
played within a capitalist global political economy. I have argued that
notions of inter-imperial rivalry between core capitalist powers are not
sufficiently attentive to the largely liberal international order constructed
under the aegis of US Empire in the postwar period. However, a number of
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leading historical materialist theorists, while also rejecting Leninist accounts
of zero-sum rivalry, would also reject the notion of an ‘American Empire’ as
too bounded to a nation-statism that is not fully attentive to the
transnational nature of contemporary capitalist globalisation and statecraft.
William Robinson’s seminal contributions to debates on contemporary
empire and imperialism are perhaps the best exemplars of this trend. His
work rejects the earlier historical materialist theories of inter-imperial rivalry
and, while working clearly within a historical materialist ambit, instead
proposes a ‘global-capitalist’ approach that rejects territorialised conceptions
of empire. In the place of a conceptualisation of American Empire Robinson
proposes a theory of a transnational state and transnational capitalist class
and argues that we have entered an era of deterritorialised transnational
empire. After outlining Robinson’s theories on contemporary capitalism and
empire I critique his position and argue for the continued relevance of the
analysis of ‘US Empire’, albeit one sensitive to the abiding continuity of a
logic of national and transnational interest.
Globalisation and the transnationalisation of empire
William Robinson’s work represents the most cogent body of historical
materialist theorisation on transnational trends under globalisation and the
ways in which the transnationalisation of capital is affecting forms of
contemporary statecraft and global class formation. For Robinson,
economic globalisation marks a decisive shift from a world economy to a
global economy. A world economy is characterised by national markets
linked together by international trade with nation-states mediating ‘the
boundaries between a world of different national economies’.46 In contrast,
the new global economy has allowed an increasingly transnationally based
capital to reorganise production relations that supersede national economies
and national states, with national systems of production becoming
fragmented and integrated into a new global configuration. Crucially, the
‘determining distinction between a world economy and global economy is the
globalization of the production process itself, or the rise of globalized circuits
of production and accumulation’.47 This is important as Robinson draws a
distinction between the qualitative difference between an earlier internatio-
nalisation of trade, which took place between nationally based systems of
production, and the central feature of contemporary economic globalisation
characterised by the transnationalisation of production of goods and services.
It is this qualitative difference that foregrounds Robinson’s periodisation of
capitalist epochs, the latest of which (and the most important for Robinson’s
analysis) is the era of neoliberal globalisation. Out of this account Robinson
draws his central thesis: the emergence of a powerful new transnational state
(TNS) and a transnational capitalist class (TCC) that is not bound to any one
state.
Robinson argues that much of the literature on globalisation works with a
Weberian conception of the state as a political apparatus with an external
relation to markets. That is, markets and states are ‘separate and even,
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oppositional, spheres, each with its own independent logic’ with ‘nation-
states’ interacting externally with markets. Robinson rejects this and instead
argues that the state is characterised as both a political apparatus but also as
the ‘institutionalization of class relations around a particular configuration of
social production’. Importantly, this implies that the economic and political
are fundamentally conjoined and assume an internal (rather than external)
relationship. For Robinson’s analysis this means that ‘the economic
globalization of capital cannot be a phenomenon isolated from the
transformations of class relations and of states’ because of this internal
relationship.48 In short, Robinson argues that:
A state is the congealment of a particular and historically determined
constellation of class forces and relations, and states are always embodied in
sets of political institutions. Hence states are: (a) a moment of class power
relations; (b) a set of political institutions (an ‘apparatus’). The state is not one
or the other; it is both in their unity.
By extension Robinson contends that we are witnessing the increased
transnationalisation of the state as a class relation as capital becomes
increasingly transnationalised. This nascent TNS comprises transnational
institutions that ‘maintain, defend, and advance the emergent hegemony of a
global bourgeoisie and its project of constructing a new global capitalist
historical bloc’.49 Importantly, this does not entail the withering away of
national states, but rather the transformation of nation-states as primarily
transnationally responsive units within a global configuration.
Transnationally orientated states provide the national infrastructure that is
necessary for economic activity, adopt policies that assure internal economic
stability and maintain social order through both coercive and consensual
means.50 In short, transformed nation states adopt and implement neoliberal
reform which is the primary policy modality of capitalist globalisation. This
in turn integrates them as circuits within the transnational circulation of
capital. The TNS thus encompasses both the transformed and transnationally
orientated neoliberal nation-states and supranational economic and political
forums such as the IMF, World Bank and World Trade Organization (WTO)
which, as yet, do not have any ‘centralized institutional form’ reminiscent of
a formal state but which nonetheless provide a co-ordinating mechanism
necessary for global capital accumulation.51 Concomitant to the rise of this
TNS is the emergence of a new global bourgeoisie: in Robinson’s terms a
newly transnational capitalist class (TCC). This new global class is directly
related to the changes in the global organisation of production and the rise of
a nascent TNS and it is the TCC that provides the agentic moment in
Robinson’s account of capitalist globalisation. The TCC is made up of the
owners of transnational capital, and is ‘tied to globalized circuits of
production, marketing, and finances unbound from particular national
territories and identities and because its interests lie in global over local or
national accumulation’.52 Importantly, this reconfiguration of global class
relations changes the dynamics of competition between nation-states with the
potential for inter-imperialist rivalry and war shifting from competing
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nation-states to new global oligarchies competing within a transnational
environment.53 Robinson’s portrait of contemporary globalisation has clear
implications for the analysis of contemporary imperialism and US Empire
insofar as the analysis of the USA as an empire foregrounds the nationally
bounded nature of the imperial project. How does Robinson deal with the
obviously disproportionate power of the USA within world capitalism?
Deterritorialising empire
Robinson argues that to analyse the USA as an imperialist power misses a
crucial nuance in contemporary capitalist globalisation. That is, rather than
involving competing nation-states, or indeed, competing blocs (for example
East Asian versus European capital) the age of transnational capital now
means that there is a diffusion of capitalist interests so that one can no longer
territorialise interests within a bounded nation-state. Robinson takes the
example of East Asian economic success and its alleged threat to US
economic preponderance.54 He contends that:
East Asian dynamism is inseparable from the massive entrance of transnational
capital and local elites have sought, not a regional circuit of accumulation in
rivalry with circuits elsewhere, but a more complete integration into globalized
circuits. ‘US’ investors have hundreds of billions of dollars invested in Asia.
Economic dynamism benefits those investors as much as it benefits local
elites.55
As such, Robinson echoes Hardt and Negri’s work on empire56 by arguing
that we have entered an era of decentred empire whereby the national
dynamics of capital accumulation that preceding ages of imperialism
embodied have been superseded by a new deterritorialised form of empire.
He thus rejects outright a theory of world order as characterised by the
potential for inter-imperial rivalry between rival capitalist states. Impor-
tantly, this does not mean that leading capitalist states are no longer central
to the maintenance of global capitalism and Robinson contends that the US
state continues to be the global hegemonic capitalist state. However, and this
is the crucial point for this paper, for Robinson the US state now acts as the
central agent of transnational capital, rather than having a nationally
grounded US ruling class. US military preponderance thus acts not to secure
American hegemony vis-a`-vis potential geopolitical rivals, but for the interests
of transnational capital as a whole. Therefore to talk of US empire is
inaccurate as it foregrounds an imperial project bounded by a nation-state
and national capital. Instead of US empire, Robinson argues that the USA
has ‘taken the lead in developing policies and strategies on behalf of the
global capitalist agenda’ because globalisation ‘has emerged in the period of
worldwide US dominance, and the concentration of resources and coercive
powers within the US national state allows it to play a leadership role on
behalf of a transnational elite’. Accordingly, the US state seeks not to
intervene to secure the interests of American capital per se, but to underwrite
and police the world for transnational capital.
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Robinson is unequivocal about this and he argues that ‘US military
conquest does not result in the creation of exclusive zones for the conquerors’
exploitation. . .but the colonization and recolonization of the vanquished for
the new global capitalism and its agents. . .the US military apparatus is the
ministry of war in the cabinet of an increasingly globally integrated ruling
class’.57 In sum, Robinson argues that we have thus entered an era of
decentred and deterritorialised transnational empire that escapes the
territorialised logic of earlier imperialisms and the geopolitical conflict
inherent within inter-imperial rivalry. Robinson’s work provides one of the
most nuanced accounts of contemporary Empire and its allegedly
deterritorialised form under contemporary globalisation. Needless to say,
his conclusions also have major ramifications for the analysis of the USA as
an empire. I now turn to consider some problems with Robinson’s account,
and argue for the continued relevance of a nationally foregrounded form of
transnational ‘US Empire’.
Retaining statism: the continued relevance of American Empire
While I agree with Robinson’s analysis of the increased trend towards
transnationalisation within contemporary globalisation, I think he has ‘put
the cart before the horse’ in his analysis of the role of the US state. Robinson
argues that world capitalism is now so transnationalised that the leading
capitalist state, the USA, is now intervening and pursuing a transnational
capitalist agenda. Put simply, the US state is now acting at the behest of the
TCC and the structural power of transnational capital.
However, when one analyses the data it is clear that the US headquarters
the vast majority of transnational corporations. For example, in 2003 the
USA headquartered 192 two of the world’s 500 largest businesses. The
second largest was Japan with 88.58 Similarly, of the world’s richest members
of the TCC, the majority are American, with eight of the world’s 10 richest
people holding US citizenship. Instead of arguing that the US state now acts
to secure a transnational outcome for transnational capital, I would argue
that when the US state acts it is because of the structural power of the US
economy within world capitalism, with transnational outcomes primarily
benefiting US capital through the USA’s preponderance of global market
power. Thus, the US state acts to secure the generic global conditions for
transnational capital accumulation less at the behest of a TCC, but rather
because, in so doing, the US state is, by default, acting in the generic interests
of its national capital because of its high level of internationalisation. In
short, the USA is the first state among capitalist equals.
If we take the concrete example of Latin America, US foreign policy has
been instrumental in implementing neoliberalism both through its multi-
lateral agreements with Latin American states and its domination of the
international institutions that are implementing neoliberal reforms. The Free
Trade Area of the Americas act (FTAA) builds upon the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) passed by the US Congress, Canada and
Mexico in 1993. NAFTA sought to integrate the economies of North America,
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Canada and Mexico into a single trading bloc, to dismantle trade barriers, to
privatise state-owned industries and to loosen the restrictions on the
movement of capital.59 Like NAFTA, the FTAA seeks to link the economies
of all the Latin American nations (with the exception of Cuba) into a single
trade bloc. The FTAA is based on a corporate-led model of development that
will accelerate post-cold war neoliberal reforms of national economies
throughout Latin America, and would presumably, in Robinson’s terms, be a
classic case of the US acting to effect a transnational outcome. However, the
FTAA contains a number of provisions that will strengthen the power of
American capital thanks to the sheer preponderance of US market power.
The GDP of North, Central and South America was $11 000 billion in 2000.
However, the USA’s share of this GDP was 75.7%, with Brazil, which was the
next largest, at 6.7%, Canada’s was 5.3%, while Mexico’s was 3.9%. The
other 31 nations comprised only 8.4%. Per capita GDP in the USA was
$30 600 in 2000 while the lowest figure, in Haiti, stood at just $460.60 The
FTAA will serve to deepen the already overwhelming power of US capital by
dismantling national trade barriers to allow easier penetration by US capital
and US-subsidised exports, through the increase in the privatisation (and
consequent foreign ownership) of state-owned industries, and the more
rigorous enforcement of the intellectual property rights of (mainly US)
corporations.61 What we have then, is, subject to resistances, the US state
acting to secure a transnational outcome which will benefit a number of
capitals and the transnationally orientated bourgeoisies of the respective
nations. But because of both the US preponderance of market power and
capital internationalisation, it will primarily benefit US corporations and
capitalists.
Similarly, I think Robinson underplays the geopolitical dimensions of a
continued US global military hegemony, and the ‘over-determining’ nature
of these dimensions upon contemporary globalisation, including the
interactions between different capitals. Robinson provocatively declares that
the US ‘military apparatus is the ministry of war in the cabinet of an
increasingly globally integrated ruling class’.62 The US remains the global
military hegemon, and spends more than the rest of the G7 countries
combined, with its military budget eight times larger than the Chinese
budget, which is the second largest.63 The US is thus the dominant military
power within capitalist globalisation, and it is this military preponderance
that reinforces US hegemony vis-a`-vis potential rivals. For example,
Robinson rejects analysts who saw the recent US intervention in Iraq as a
case of American imperialism. Instead he argues that the Bush administra-
tion’s plan was in fact a ‘blueprint for the transnational agenda in the region’
and not a ‘US imperialist plan to gain the upper hand over French, German,
and Russian competition’ by monopolising Iraq’s natural resources,
including its crucial oil reserves.64 In the case of oil this is of course correct
insofar as US policy has long favoured an open world oil market which has
mutually benefited the leading capitalist powers, and through which the USA
has acquired crucial energy sources via world markets. Robinson is thus
correct to point out the transnational outcome in the case of the equality of
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access to oil on international markets by other capitalist powers. However,
what Robinson’s account misses is the fact that, while US military hegemony
serves the wider interests of global capital by (potentially) stabilising a region
so geostrategically crucial to industrialised economies, it also entrenches US
hegemony over other leading capitalist powers. In short, US political and
military dominance in the Middle East has been a key plank of postwar US
hegemony over other leading capitalist states within the global political
economy because the US derives enormous structural power through its (and
its proxies) capacity to play ‘cop on the beat’ in a region where democratic,
nationalist or radical Islamist social forces threaten a stability geared towards
the generic interests of the West as a whole.65 The USA also derives huge
economic benefits from these arrangements not least of which has been the
ongoing recycling of huge Middle Eastern petrodollar reserves into the US
economy and the continued use of the dollar as the currency of choice for
world oil markets (which in turn allows the USA to run a huge budget deficit
and finance its imperial adventures overseas).66 Thus, while US intervention
in the region does benefit a number of capitals (by ensuring security of oil
supply to world markets) Robinson’s analysis does not extend far enough to
interrogate the kinds of derivative power that US dominance in the region
affords the US state in relation to other core powers. Robinson’s
transnational argument, while correct to pinpoint the redundancy of
conceptions of contemporary world imperialism as characterised by overt
rivalry and zero-sum competition between capitalist powers, is not
sufficiently attentive to the enduring nature of a US Empire that is still
subject to a logic of ‘national interest’ while conjugating this interest with
those of other leading capitalist powers. In short, Robinson fails to capture
the dual national and transnational logics that have long operated at the
heart of US Empire.
The dual logics of American Empire
Because of the structural position of the US state as both the core hegemonic
capitalist state within global capitalism and the state to which other capitalist
powers have looked to ensure world order, it has long occupied a dual role
that has been subject to both a ‘national’ logic seeking to maximise US
national interests and a ‘transnational’ logic whereby it has played a co-
ordinating role that has sought to reproduce a global political economy
conducive to other core capitalist states. Importantly, these two logics have
long complemented each other insofar as, by reproducing and defending
world capitalism, the USA has also reinforced its own position as the core
hegemonic state within the international system. As Gowan argues, US
Empire has worked principally because ‘the US state has not just been
pursuing its own interests at the expense of all its rivals, but securing the
general conditions for the expansion of capital as a system, in which they
have an interest too’.67 During the Cold War these two logics were mutually
complementary in part because the potential for Soviet power projection in
Europe and revolutionary ferment in the Third World threatened capitalism
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as a whole, with no core state apart from the US possessing the capacity to
check these threats. This geostrategic reality, coupled with the USA’s
successful interpenetration of other core states through the internationalisa-
tion of American capital and modes of multilateral co-ordination, meant that
other capitalist powers were happy to shelter under the umbrella of American
Empire (to the chagrin of a number of contemporary neo-conservative
analysts).68 In short, the threat of Soviet power and various forms of third
world oppositionism served to corral the ‘West’ under US leadership, while
the internationalisation of American capital served to underwrite the
recovery of shattered capitalist economies and the hegemony of European
elites.
However, in the post-cold war absence of the Soviet threat and especially
after the 11 September terrorist attacks, the tensions between the American
Empire’s role of positive-sum transnational co-ordination and its pursuit of
more peculiarly American interests is becoming more fraught. While previous
US administrations have preferred what Robert Kagan has called the
‘unilateralist iron fist inside the multilateralist velvet glove’69 (for example,
Clinton’s Secretary of State Madeline Albright’s declaration that the USA
will act ‘multilaterally when we can, unilaterally as we must’70), the more
overtly unilateralist orientation of the Bush administration reflects a crude,
but realist desire for policy autonomy freed from the constraints and
permission-loops intrinsic to multilateral forms of strategic co-ordination.
This impulse has become even more pressing given the nature of the threats
directed specifically at the American imperium. As Charles Krauthammer
has aptly captured, transnational forms of multilateral governance and
security co-ordination between the USA and other core states has served to
reduce ‘American freedom of action by making it subservient to, dependent
on, constricted by the will—and interests—of other nations’. By succumbing
too heavily to this logic, the American Empire is gradually becoming a
‘Gulliver’ tied down ‘with a thousand strings’.71
This tension between the dual logics at the heart of American Empire
places the USA in a bind in many ways. On the one hand, given the USA’s
economic and military preponderance, the imperial temptation is very strong
and the events of 11 September have hastened the USA’s desire to attain
strategic manoeuvrability for its war on terror unencumbered by the often
burdensome requirements of multilateral forms of governance. As Richard
Perle, the former chairman of the USA’s Defense Policy Board Advisory
Committee, argued:
I think it is time for us to say to the world if necessary that we have been
attacked, a war was initiated against us, and we are going to defend ourselves,
and we’re not going to let the decisions to do that, the manner in which we do
it, the targets we select be decided by a show of hands by countries whose
interests cannot be identical to our own and who haven’t suffered what we have
suffered.72
On the other hand, as the USA becomes more overtly imperialist by
succumbing to the logic of national interest, it also begins to undermine the
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legitimacy that it derives through the more transnationally orientated forms
of multilateral co-ordination under the aegis of American Empire. As Leo
Panitch and Sam Gindin pointedly observe ‘an American imperialism that is
so blatantly imperialistic risks losing the very appearance of not being
imperialist’ that has ‘historically made it plausible and attractive’.73 Along-
side this potential loss of legitimacy inherent within a more overt
unilateralism driven by the logic of national interest is the very real potential
for other states to balance against an American Empire that is so obviously
pursuing its own interests to the detriment of key allies (or minimally, failing
at least to pay lip-service to the sensitivities of ‘old Europe’). This is
multiplied by the fact that other core states need to conjugate the needs of the
imperial centre with their own domestic requirements of consensual rule, with
the task of legitimation become even harder when core democratic states are
threatened by popular pressures to resist the vagaries of American Empire.74
(To date Bush’s doctrine of pre-emptive war is proving a much harder sell
than previous imperial interventions justified under the pretext of humani-
tarian intervention).75 These processes, combined with the failure of leading
capitalist powers even to agree on whether Bush’s pre-emptive wars or
international terrorism constitute the primary security threat to Western
interests, also increase the tensions within the US imperium. In a sense, then,
in their singularity neither theorists of inter-imperial rivalry who emphasise
the inherent geopolitical rivalry between the USA and other core capitalist
states or Robinson’s more transnationalist arguments capture in their
entirety the complex sets of pressures, constraints and temptations inherent
within contemporary American Empire and world order. In the place of these
opposed visions I have both argued for the continued salience of the analysis
of American Empire as a world analytic but with a sensitivity to the dual and
conjoined national and transnational logics at the heart of this imperium.
What conclusions can be drawn from this account?
Conclusion
This paper has rejected the periodisation inherent within the new imperial
discourses that link the emergence of American Empire to either the post-
cold war or post-9/11 eras and has instead called for an alternative
historisation of the role of the US state within a capitalist global political
economy. In a similar vein, historical materialist analysts who posit the
continued geopolitical and economic rivalry between US Empire and other
advanced capitalist states are not sufficiently attentive to the largely benign
and pacific imperium constructed by the USA in the postwar period which
has incorporated hitherto potential rivals to US hegemony. Alongside the
construction of this imperium has been a concomitant internationalisation of
capital that has served to further cement a relatively cohesive Western bloc
under the aegis of American Empire. Concomitantly, I have argued that
‘global-capitalist’ theorists who critique a conception of American Empire as
too heavily bounded to a lingering ‘nation-statism’ are not sufficiently
attentive to the abiding logic of national interest inherent within con-
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temporary imperialism. Instead, because of the US state’s unique position
within the global political economy, I have argued that it is subject to both a
national and transnational logic.
It is obvious that the unilateralism of the Bush administration and its re-
election have generated a remarkable degree of hostility not only from the
left, but also from significant sections of America’s foreign policy elite. In a
recent piece John Ikenberry paints an optimistic picture for the future of
inter-state relations and argues (while resisting the term itself) that the
American Empire will have to return to multilateral forms of transnational
co-ordination largely because of the economic interdependence of US,
European and Japanese capital. Ikenberry also emphasises that by doing so
the USA will ‘signal restraint and commitment to other states thereby
encouraging the acquiescence and cooperation of weaker states’.76 One could
also add that the ongoing failure of the USA to indigenise its rule in Iraq or
even convincingly sell the intervention to its own domestic population
underlines the folly of relying solely on its overwhelming military superiority
to undergird its global empire.
Importantly, within contemporary international politics, the USA’s
overwhelming military power does not translate into an enhanced capacity
to coerce key allies (however, with the militarisation of a number of third
world states under the rubric of a war on terrorism, the potential for
‘blowback’ against theWwest as a whole is considerable).77 In many ways the
Iraq intervention represents the most prominent national moment of the
American Empire. Crucially, Iraq has rendered that moment still-born. How
long the USA takes to learn this will perhaps be the single most important
determinate factor for the hegemony of the American Empire in relation to
other core states. Importantly, however, outside the relatively benign
capitalist core, there is no reason to expect that forms of imperial statecraft
and their articulation to local sub-imperialisms will prove any less costly for
the vast majority of the global South.78
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